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Abstract
In a structural VAR framework, we study the impact of oil price shocks in the
global crude oil market on the dynamics of the entire yield curve in four indus-
trialised countries with different positions on the oil market; the US, Canada,
Norway, and South Korea. Responses of the term structure factors to oil market
shocks are shown to differ contingent on the underlying sources that drive oil
price shocks and the country’s dependence on oil. Oil market-specific demand
shocks result in increases in the level factor in oil-importing countries, but have
no such effect in oil-exporting countries. Oil supply disruptions have short-lived
negative responses of the slope factors in the US and Canada, associated with
loosening monetary policy, whilst demand side shocks tend to lead to increases
the slope in all countries. Overall, oil supply and demand shocks jointly ac-
count for a considerable amount of the observed variation in the term structure
of interest rates.
Keywords: Oil prices shocks, Term structure of interest rates, Yield curve,
Variance decomposition
JEL Classification: E43, E44, G12, Q43
IWe thank seminar participants at the University of Bath, Brunel University, and ISEFI-
2017, and especially Chris Martin, Kent Matthews, Bruce Morley and the two anonymous
reviewers for their suggestions and comments. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not reflect the official views of the Bank of Korea.
∗Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: c.ioannidis@aston.ac.uk (C. Ioannidis), kakook@bok.or.kr (K. Ka)
Preprint submitted to Energy Economics April 9, 2018
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
1. Introduction
Oil prices are considered as one of the main drivers of business cycle fluc-
tuations. Since the sequential oil price shocks during the early and late 1970s,
the impact of oil shocks on macroeconomic activity has been investigated by
many empirical studies. Literature initiated by Hamilton (1983) has focused
almost exclusively on the relationship between changes in the price of oil and
economic activities, revealing a significant negative impact of oil price hikes
on GDP growth (see, Hamilton 1985, 1996, 2009; Rotemberg and Woodford
1996). Attention has also been given to the role of oil prices in determining
inflation (Hooker 2002) and inflation expectations (Harris et al. 2009; Coibion
and Gorodnichenko 2015), and more recently their declining pass-through into
inflation and economic activities (Blanchard and Gal´ı 2007; Chen 2009; Clark
and Terry 2010; Baumeister and Peersman 2013).
Even though much literature has studied the macroeconomic influences of oil
price shocks, research on the relationship between oil prices and financial market
variables has been limited and related studies (for example, Chen et al. 1986;
Huang et al. 1996; Kilian and Park 2009) have mainly focused on the effects
of oil shocks on stock returns. In comparison, little attention has been paid to
the effect of oil prices changes on the bond market. Literature which considers
the response of interest rates to oil price shocks has focused on the short-end of
the yield curve, in an attempt to quantify the contribution of monetary policy
responses to the propagation of oil price shocks (see, for example, Bernanke
et al. 1997).
This paper attempts to fill this gap by incorporating the term structure
factors and variables driving supply and demand in global crude oil markets
into a structural VAR (SVAR) model. In this context, we examine the effects of
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oil price shocks on the term structure of interest rates. Furthermore, to consider
the different dynamics between oil shocks and the yield curve in oil-importing
and oil-exporting economies, we study four industrialised countries with distinct
positions in global oil market; the US, Canada, Norway, and South Korea.
More specifically, we examine the effects of three different oil shocks in the
spirit of Kilian (2009)’s “Not all oil price shocks are alike.” To relate the supply
and demand oil shocks with the term structure of interest rates, we use the well
established framework from the finance literature which summarises the entire
term structure into several latent yield factors - level, slope, and curvature - as
the only relevant factors to characterise the yield curve (see, for example Litter-
man and Scheinkman 1991). The factor model of the term structure combined
with the decomposition of oil price shocks, into different causes, enable us to
characterise the responses of the yield curve to various shocks and to calculate
the entire yield curve movement after them. To our knowledge, this is the first
paper answering this question, linking oil price shocks to the term structure of
interest rates.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we examine the effects
of oil price shocks on the entire yield curve, rather than limiting our focus on
a particular interest rate, for example, short-term policy rate. To interpret
the response of the latent yield factors, we follow the methodology of recent
macro-finance literature which studies the macroeconomic forces that shape the
term structure of interest rates (Ang and Piazzesi 2003; Diebold et al. 2006).
Second, we estimate the different dynamic effects on the yield curve due to three
demand and supply oil price shocks from distinct underlying sources. Third, we
estimate the model using the term structures of four industrialised countries to
establish whether the pattern of term structure responses to the oil price shocks
is different according to their position in the crude oil market.
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To ascertain the empirical robustness of our results we undertake the analysis
over two periods, guided by the behaviour of the short-run rate of interest.
From the onset of the financial crisis, central banks have taken drastic steps in
reducing the monetary policy instrument to near zero and kept it as low for
an unprecedented lengthy period. In addition, the introduction of quantitative
easing in the US and UK has exercised strong downward pressure on the long-
term rates altering the slope of the yield curve. In the light of such changes,
we conduct our analysis over two periods. The sub-sample period ends in 2008,
the onset of the crisis, where short-term rates were at their ‘historically’ normal
levels. Our full sample period includes the period of the crisis and the exercise
of unconventional monetary policy. The differences in responses, if any, between
the ‘normal’ and ‘extended’ periods will be due to the unusual behaviour of the
short-term rate and quantitative easing. This approach helps us establish the
severity of the impact of oil shocks of any description in normal and crisis times.
Our estimation results show that the responses of the four countries’ term
structure are not alike, depending upon the type of shocks and the countries’
position in the crude oil market. Broadly speaking, the response of the factors of
the yield curve to the different sources of oil market shocks can be summarised
as follows: The impulse response analysis shows that negative oil supply shocks
have differential effects on the level (long-end), with rising levels in Norway and
South Korea and little effect on US and Canada; in these two countries the
shocks result in lower short rates, steepening the yield curve. This result is
associated with the conventional monetary policy reaction aiming at offsetting
the recessionary effects of oil supply disruption. Following an oil market-specific
demand shocks, the level of the yield curve in oil-importing countries (the US
and South Korea) increases noticeably, but the response of the same factor in
oil-exporting countries (Canada and Norway) is very modest.
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In all countries, the slope increases after oil market-specific demand shocks
following a rise of the short rate, which is the consequence of the monetary
policy’s reaction to reduce inflationary pressures. Finally, aggregate demand
shocks make the slope factor in oil-importing countries less steep, but have no
such effect in oil-exporting countries. The same shocks decrease the curvature
(middle-end) of the yield curve in oil-importing countries making yield curve
less concave.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: A brief literature review is
presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the Nelson-Siegel methodology and
the SVAR model. Section 4 provides a description of the data. Section 5
discusses empirical results and comments on the dynamics of the term structure
responses to oil shocks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Finance literature models treat nominal yields as functions of several unob-
servable factors. Imposing the no-arbitrage condition, yields of various maturi-
ties acquire consistent dynamic evolution according to underlying factors (Duffie
and Kan 1996; Dai and Singleton 2002). However, these canonical arbitrage-free
term structure models have not provided much intuition regarding the macroe-
conomic forces that drive the underlying yield factors. The empirical literature
has attempted to include macro variables and builds macro-structures into fi-
nancial term structure models to incorporate the fundamental macroeconomic
drivers of the yield curve.
In a seminal work by Ang and Piazzesi (2003), the combination of macroe-
conomic and latent yield factors results in a state vector whose dynamics follow
a first order Gaussian VAR. As macro variables, they use principal components
of the series that represent inflation and output measures. The short rate is
5
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assumed to be an affine function of the state variables. With the aid of no-
arbitrage assumption, yields with various maturities become affine functions of
the state variables which include both financial and macro factors. They con-
clude that macro factors explain significant of variations of bond yields and the
model incorporating macro factors forecasts better in comparison to a model
relying exclusively on financial factors.
The initial macro-finance models have included a limited number of macroe-
conomic aggregates such as output and inflation. Based on the tradition of
Taylor (1993), these have focused on using information about output and infla-
tion as determinants of the movements of the short-term rate. As reported in
Ang and Piazzesi (2003), the shocks from these macroeconomic factors do not
have sufficient explanatory power to account for interest rate movements with
longer maturities.
Subsequently, a large number of empirical studies have followed and estab-
lished the relationship between macroeconomic variables and the term structure
of interest rates. They consider different structures in factor dynamics or intro-
duce additional latent and macro factors.1 For example, Diebold et al. (2006)
and Ang et al. (2007) allowed for feedback between macro and yield factors in
the dynamics of the state variables in a bidirectional way.2 Rudebusch and Wu
(2008) exploit this approach and attempt to interpret the evolution of the la-
tent factors in terms of macroeconomic variables.3 In particular, the first factor,
associated with level in the yield curve, is interpreted as an interim or medium-
term inflation target and the slope factor is linked to the central bank’s policy
1This kind of research includes, for example, Bernanke et al. (2004), Dewachter and Lyrio
(2006), Ang et al. (2006), and Lildholdt et al. (2007).
2The model of Diebold et al. (2006) is rooted on Nelson and Siegel (1987), but Ang et al.
(2007) build their model under the no-arbitrage assumption.
3Other models with this strand include Ho¨rdahl et al. (2006) and Rudebusch et al. (2006).
More recently, literature such as Bekaert et al. (2010) and Ho¨rdahl et al. (2008) extend the
existing model in a way that allows more fully specified structural DSGE model.
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responses to stabilise output and inflation fluctuations. Their empirical results
conclude that the macroeconomic factors are closely related to the financial
latent factors driving the yield curve.
Another strand of macro-finance literature uses a dynamic factor model
which is originated from the term structure model of Nelson and Siegel (1987).
For example, Diebold and Li (2006) reinterpret the Nelson-Siegel representa-
tion as a dynamic latent factor model. The advantage of the Nelson-Siegel type
model is that it is free from the estimation problems of the canonical affine
no-arbitrage term structure models that suffer from empirical performance in
terms of fit and out-of-sample predictability (Duffee 2002) due to its parsimo-
nious framework. Diebold and Li (2006)’s simplified model where factor dy-
namics are assumed to follow a first-order vector auto-regression has been used
for forecasting purposes with some success.
To improve the performance of the original models and establish explicit
links with the macroeconomic environment, additional macroeconomic factors
have been added to account for the observed movements of the yield curve. Dai
and Philippon (2005) using affine structures, and Afonso and Martins (2012)
using the econometric approach of Diebold and Li (2006) incorporate additional
elements representing fiscal conditions such as the government deficit. They ar-
gue that fiscal shocks indeed affect long-term rates through the expectations
of the future short-term rate as well as the risk premium. Chadha and Waters
(2014) consider a large number of macroeconomic variables into a macro-finance
model and Dewachter and Iania (2012) introduce two additional financial fac-
tors, liquidity-related and return-forecasting factors. The liquidity-related factor
is a measure of money market tension, whilst the return-forecasting is a factor
driving the one period expected excess holding return. They found that the
model fit with the two financial factors is enhanced, and that the additional
7
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factors have a significant influence on the yield curve.
Even though the macro-finance literature has largely investigated the possi-
ble role of macroeconomic factors in the dynamics of the term structure, studies
on the effect of oil price shocks on the term structure are relatively limited.
The literature has been mostly focused on only the short-end of the yield curve,
with the aim of evaluating the possible role of monetary policy response in the
propagation of oil price shocks. Using US data in a VAR model, Bernanke et al.
(1997) investigate endogenous monetary policy response to oil price shocks in
an attempt to investigate whether it is the cause of past economic downturns
which followed after them. They concluded that the systematic response to oil
price shocks is indeed the main reason for these recessions and that different
monetary policy could have been used to avoid their recessionary consequences.
Their argument is challenged by Hamilton and Herrera (2004) who show
that the counter-factual paths of the policy rates assumed to eliminate the
output decline are implausible and cannot be implemented. They also show
that when alternative lag lengths were used in the estimation of the VAR these
altered the size of the effect attributed to oil shocks. Kilian and Lewis (2011)
re-validate this result: that there is no credible evidence that monetary policy
responses in the 1970s and 1980s amplified the effects of oil price shocks causing
significant fluctuations in real output. They argue that the monetary policy
reaction framework in Bernanke et al. (1997) and other following studies have a
weakness in the way that they assume policy makers respond regardless of their
underlying sources.4
Kilian (2009) considers whether distinct oil price shocks driven by diverse
4Cologni and Manera (2008) have studied endogenous monetary policy response to oil price
shocks for the G-7 countries. Their simulation exercises using SVAR model suggest that the
effects of the oil price shocks in the US is largely due to the monetary policy reactions, but
for other countries such as Canada, France, and Italy the total impact is offset partly by
monetary easing.
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underlying determinants have differential effects on the economy. He classifies
three kinds of shocks: shocks to the reduction in oil supply, shocks driven by
increased overall demand, and shocks from the changes in the precautionary oil
demand. Using a structural VAR model with recursive restrictions, he identifies
oil price shocks and allocates them into the three categories. Estimation results
show that historical oil price changes have been associated with a combination
of all three types of shocks. What is of interest is that, after the decomposition,
it emerges that certain oil price shocks are connected to demand-side, a finding
that is inconsistent with the common belief that oil price shocks are mostly
concerned to supply disruptions and these have been the main cause of oil price
fluctuations. He also finds distinct effects of each shock on output growth and
inflation. For example, a shock originating from supply disruption causes an
immediate but temporary drop in current output associated with trivial effects
on inflation. Whilst, a shock caused by an increase in global aggregate oil
demand is results in a delayed and pronounced fall in output and increased
inflation.
There is strong empirical evidence of their influence of inflation expectations
and subsequently on both the short and long rates. More specifically in terms
of the short rate Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) provide evidence that the
FOMC in setting the policy rate take into account oil price shocks and Elliot
et al. (2015) from the Bank of England show that even the expected 5-year
inflation 5 years from now (5y5y inflation expectation) is influenced by current
oil price movements.5 In the light of the existing empirical evidence that both
ends of the yield curve are influenced by oil price shocks, the aim of this investi-
gation is to calculate the impact of such shocks on the entity of the yield curve
5In their regression exercises, a 10% increase in daily oil price has shown to cause around
4 basis points in the US 5y5y and 2 basis points in Euro area 5y5y inflation expectation.
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as represented by its essential elements.
3. Methodology
We use the conventional macro-finance framework to establish the nature of
the relationship between oil price shocks and the term structure of interest rates.
Since Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), finance literature summarises the term
structure of interest rates into three latent factors, representing level, slope, and
curvature of the yield curve. In general, these three factors can explain more
than 99% of the entire movement in the term structure. To extract three latent
yield factors, we follow the approach of Diebold et al. (2006) who modify the
Nelson and Siegel (1987)’s parsimonious exponential function form with time-
varying parameters in state space setting. Unlike typical finance term structure
model restricted with the no-arbitrage condition, the Nelson-Siegel model does
not impose the no-arbitrage condition (Bjo¨rk and Christensen 1999; Filipovic´
1999).
Our choice of model is based on the argument of Diebold and Rudebusch
(2013) that the imposition of the no-arbitrage restriction is not necessarily im-
portant when the bond market is deep and liquid enough that its pricing satisfies
the arbitrage free conditions. Coroneo et al. (2011) document that the Nelson-
Siegel yield curve model is compatible with the models imposing no-arbitrage
constraints in the case of US yield curve. Diebold and Li (2006) show that the
parsimony but flexible functional form of the model enhances the empirical fit
and results in good forecasting performance.
The estimation of the state-space yield curve and the analysis of macro-
finance VAR approach follows two steps. First, we estimate the country-specific
three latent yield factors using the Kalman filter, as Diebold et al. (2006).
Second, we estimate SVARs with each country’s three latent yield factors and
10
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variables which enable to identify the supply and demand shocks in the global
crude oil market. This procedure is similar to empirical methodology employed
by Afonso and Martins (2012) who examine the effect of fiscal behaviour on
the term structure of interest rates. They argue that the yield curve factors
estimated using an integrated model with both macro and yield curve data do
not differ much from ones attainable with the pure financial state-space model.
Furthermore, this approach enables us to circumvent the restriction of the first-
order specification, which is usually assumed in the finance literature.6 Using
this methodology, we report the estimated latent yield factors and analyse the
effects of the three different oil shocks on yield curve dynamics.
3.1. Term Structure Factor Model Representation
The conventional Nelson-Siegel model (1987) has the following functional
form representing the cross-section of yields as
y(τ) = β1 + β2
(
1− e−λτ
λτ
)
+ β3
(
1− e−λτ
λτ
− e−λτ
)
, (1)
where y(τ) denotes the set of yields at any moment with the corresponding
maturity τ , which can be understood as a cross-sectional representation at any
moment in time. Figure 1 shows the factor loading on each latent yield factor
fixing the value of λ at 0.0609 as assumed in Diebold and Li (2006). The loading
on β2 begins at 1 and decays as the maturity increases, so it is interpreted as
a short-term factor. The loading on β3 starts at 0, increases until the maturity
reaches around 24 months, and decays to zero, so it can be interpreted as a
medium-term factor. Finally the loading for β1 is 1, so it is interpreted as the
6Empirical studies investigating the transmission of oil price shocks usually selects a large
number of lags to capture the delayed effect of oil price shocks on the economy. Hamilton
and Herrera (2004) discuss that the importance of choosing a lag length and show that the
number of lags is needed to be large enough, suggesting less than 12 lags can fail to ensure
the reliability of the impulse response estimates.
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long-term factor. According to their effect on the overall yield curve, the three
factors can be interpreted as the level, slope, and curvature in a conventional
yield curve model. Diebold et al. (2006) show that the estimated factors mimic
closely their empirical proxies for level (yt(120)), slope (yt(3) − yt(120)), and
curvature (2×yt(24)−(yt(3)+yt(120))), where the values in parenthesis indicate
the months to maturity.
To extend Nelson-Siegel’s framework to represent entire yield curve, Diebold
and Li (2006) consider βi’s as time-varying yield factors with factor loadings 1,
(1−e−λτ )/λτ , (1−e−λτ )/λτ−e−λτ . Then we can rewrite Equation (1) to relate
the β coefficients to the factors’ interpretation as level, slope, and curvature as
yt(τ) = lt + st
(
1− e−λτ
λτ
)
+ ct
(
1− e−λτ
λτ
− e−λτ
)
, (2)
where t = 1, . . . , T and τ = 1, . . . , N .
The dynamic movement of the three factors (lt, st, ct) is assumed to follow a
first-order VAR which becomes the transition equation controlling the dynamics
of the state vector as

lt − µl
st − µs
ct − µc
 =

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33


lt−1 − µl
st−1 − µs
ct−1 − µc
+

ηt(l)
ηt(s)
ηt(c)
 , (3)
where µl, µs, and µc are mean values and ηt(l), ηt(s), and ηt(c) are innovations
for the respective factors. The measurement equation which relates yields with
12
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N maturities to the three latent factors is

yt(τ1)
yt(τ2)
...
yt(τN )

=

1 1−e
−τ1λ
τ1λ
1−e−τ1λ
τ1λ
− e−τ1λ
1 1−e
−τ2λ
τ2λ
1−e−τ2λ
τ2λ
− e−τ2λ
...
...
...
1 1−e
−τNλ
τNλ
1−e−τNλ
τNλ
− e−τNλ


lt
st
ct
+

εt(τ1)
εt(τ2)
...
εt(τN )

, (4)
where t = 1, . . . , T , and εt(τ1), εt(τ2), . . . , εt(τN ) are measurement errors. We
can rewrite this state-space system in a matrix form as
(ft − µ) = A(ft−1 − µ) + ηt (5)
yt(τ) = Λft + εt(τ). (6)
where ft = (lt st ct)
′, µ = (µl µs µc)′, and ηt = (ηt(l) ηt(s) ηt(c))′. A is 3×3
matrix in the transition equation, and Λ is a factor loading matrix which con-
nects the factors to the interest rates vector yt(τ) with maturities τ1, τ2, . . . , τN .
The factor loadings are functions of maturities and determine the dynamics of
yt(τ).
We assume that the covariance matrix of the system is block diagonal as the
measurement and transition innovations are uncorrelated to each other and to
the initial state such that
(
ηt
εt
)
∼WN
((
0
0
)
,
(
Q 0
0 H
))
, (7)
E(f0η
′
t) = 0, (8)
E(f0ε
′
t) = 0. (9)
The factor disturbances (ηt) are allowed to be correlated, whilst the disturbances
of measurement equation are assumed i.i.d, resulting in a diagonal covariance
13
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matrix (H) as is standard in the literature. The diagonal covariance matrix
of the yield measurement equation means that the deviations of observed rates
from the estimated yield curve are not correlated. The conditions of Equations
(8) and (9) ensure the optimality of the Kalman filter delivering maximum-
likelihood estimates and subsequently optimal smoothed estimates of the latent
factors.
3.2. Identifying Oil Price Shocks
Even though crude oil prices are driven by distinct oil demand and supply
changes related closely to the global economic conditions, the price of crude
oil has long been regarded as an exogenous shock to any domestic economy.
However, oil price fluctuations emanating from diverse sources can have differ-
ent macroeconomic consequences. The different effects of oil price shocks with
distinct underlying source have received much attention in recent literature.
Kilian (2009) stresses that oil price shocks have different dynamic effects on
macroeconomic aggregates depending on their underlying sources.
The two consecutive oil crises, manifested by sharp price increases, in the
early and late 1970s were originated from supply disruptions in the Middle
East and have been widely believed to be related to stagnant growth and price
inflation. Kilian (2009) argues that similar oil price increases driven by growing
global aggregate demand, instead of supply disruptions, will manifest themselves
in higher output and inflation, in contrast to the stagflation normally associated
with the same phenomenon. Interest rates with diverse maturities might react
differently to the oil price shocks with various sources. For example, if the
oil price increase originates from oil supply disruption, the effect from higher
expected inflation will be partly offset by its stagnant effect on the real economy.
On the contrary, if oil price increases due to global aggregate demand, overall
interest rates in oil importing countries would result in temporary increases
14
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reflecting expectations over inflation and economic growth in the future.
A structural VAR model is used to examine the relationship between oil
price shocks and the term structure of interest rates. We separate three oil
price shocks - global oil supply, global aggregate demand, and oil market-specific
demand shocks - and examine their effect on the three yield latent factors. We
use following p-order standard SVAR model:
A0xt = c+
p∑
j=1
Ajxt−j + εt, (10)
where xt represents a vector of endogenous variables (∆prodt reat rpot lt st ct)
′.
∆prodt denotes the percent change in global crude oil production, reat is the in-
dex of real economic activity built by Kilian (2009), and rpot is real price of oil.
A0 is the contemporaneous coefficient matrix, Aj denotes the auto-regressive
coefficient matrices, c is a vector of constants, and εt is the vector of serially
uncorrelated structural disturbances.
The system relies on the simple contemporary recursive restrictions. Using
the Cholesky triangular factorization, i.e. A−10 has a recursive structure, the
reduced form errors (et = A
−1
0 εt) are linear combinations of the structural
errors (εt) as,
et =

e∆prodt
ereat
erpot
elt
est
ect

=

a11 0 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0 0 0
a41 a42 a43 a44 0 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55 0
a61 a62 a63 a64 a65 a66


εoil supply shockt
εaggregate demand shockt
εoil specific−demand shockt
εlevel shockt
εslope shockt
εcurvature shockt

.
(11)
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The rationale for identification is motivated by Kilian (2009), Kilian and Vega
(2011), and Afonso and Martins (2012). Specifically, oil supply shocks are all
shocks that affect oil production (∆prodt) within a month, based on the fact
that oil production cannot be adjusted in a short period. Aggregate demand
shocks are other shocks affecting the demand for industrial commodities (reat),
approximating global real economic activity within a month. Oil market-specific
demand shocks are all the other shocks which affect the real price of oil (rpot)
and are related to the precautionary demand for oil.7
We assume country-specific financial variables, i.e. the three latent term
structure factors (lt, st, and ct) are affected instantaneously by oil price shocks,
but variables of global crude oil market are not affected contemporaneously
by the domestic yield factors. Kilian and Vega (2011) test whether energy
prices respond instantaneously to US domestic macroeconomic news at daily
and monthly horizons. They find no evidence of systematic feedback from
macroeconomic news to energy prices, which support the identifying restric-
tion in the model that assumes no contemporaneous effect from country-specific
macroeconomic and finance shocks.8
In constructing the SVAR, the choice of lag length is an important consid-
eration. Hamilton (2003) allows four lags in quarters to test for the nonlinear
relation between oil price changes and GDP growth using quarterly data. Re-
7In recent study, Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) propose a less restrictive identification
strategy using Bayesian formulation. They reveal that traditional approaches to SVAR models
by Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2014) can be understood as a special cases of
Bayesian inferences with strong prior assumptions. However, they confirm that the model
with relaxed prior beliefs produces core implications similar to those in previous studies.
8Three oil price shocks identified in our six-variable VAR model are highly correlated
with with those identified with Kilian (2009)’s model with correlation coefficients for the US
are 0.85 (oil supply shocks), 0.90 (aggregate demand shocks), and 0.92 (oil market-specific
demand shocks). For the other countries, the relations are less close due to shorter sample
period. However, we confirm that all the correlation coefficients between the shocks identified
by the two models are above 0.72 in any case.
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lated literature typically reports the effects of oil price shocks on macroeconomic
variables peak after three to four quarters (Kilian 2008 among many others).
In a more recent paper, Kilian (2009) allows for 24 monthly lags. We choose 12
lags because the series of monthly interest rates are not long enough to produce
reliable decompositions for the four countries in this study. This choice can
also be justified considering a potentially long delay of the effects on the term
structure from structural oil price shocks.9
4. Data
The data representing global oil supply and the status of global demand are
available from 1973 on a monthly basis. The data for oil supply is world crude oil
production and is provided by EIA (US Energy Information Administration). A
monthly index representing demand for industrial commodities is used to proxy
global real economic activity.10 The real price of oil is the monthly average
refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil provided by the US Department of
Energy and is deflated by the US CPI available from FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data) by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.11
End-of-month nominal interest rates data for the US, Canada, Norway, and
South Korea are used representing countries with different compositions in oil
production and consumption. The US and South Korea are classified as oil
9Estimation with 24 lags for the US and Canada, however, gives qualitatively similar
results.
10This index is proposed in Kilian (2009). The extended series can be retrieved from Kilian’s
website (http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html). The index is based
on freight rates for dry bulk cargoes deflated by US CPI. The main advantage of this index
representing global economic activity is that it does not require summarising procedure using
exchange-rate weighting. It is also free from shifting country weights covering the demand
from global markets, which is typically not satisfied by alternative measures such as the OECD
industrial production.
11The imported refiner acquisition cost (IRAC) has traditionally considered as a good indica-
tor for the global price of crude oil since the US imports various types of crude oil (Baumeister
and Kilian 2014). The correlation of the monthly average IRAC and the WTI between 1980
and 2015 is 0.993 and that between IRAC and the Brent is 0.997. The series of IRAC since
1974:1 is provided by the US Department of Energy and extended backwards in Kilian (2009).
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importing countries, and Norway and Canada represent oil exporting countries.
Each country has kept its position as a net oil exporter or oil importer dur-
ing the whole estimation period. Figure 2 shows the status of the countries’
dependencies and intensities of oil.12 Norway marked the lowest energy de-
pendency (-485.9%, net energy imports divided by total energy usage) among
OECD countries (18.5% on average) whilst South Korea, is among countries
with the highest dependency (83.5%). Total trade volume compared to GDP
of the US is 29.9%, so it represents large closed economy. The others can be
classified as small open economies and their trade volumes are larger than 60%
of GDP (as of 2013, OECD National Accounts data).
The US Treasury yield curve is obtained from the updated data-set built
by Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) on the Federal Reserve website and Canadian yield
curve for zero-coupon bonds are provided by Bank of Canada. The Norwe-
gian yield curve is from Wright (2011) and updated using data from Norges
Bank. Government zero-coupon rates for South Korea are provided by Ko-
rea Asset Pricing. As the available maturities of the yield curves are different
among countries, we build yield curves with 17 maturities for each country using
Svensson (1994)’s methodology and extract three latent term structure factors.
Figure 3 plots end-of-month bond yields at 17 maturities ranging from 3 months
to 10 years for the four countries.
The estimation periods by country vary due to data limitations for gov-
ernment zero coupon rates. For the US, the longest estimation period for the
SVAR model is from January 1973 to December 2015. For the other countries,
the estimation periods are: Canada (January 1986 to December 2015), Norway
12Energy dependency is net energy imports divided by energy usage as of 2013. Net energy
imports are estimated by IEA (International Energy Agency) as energy use less production,
both measured in oil equivalents. The oil intensity is the ratio of oil consumption (Mtoes)
over gross domestic product measured in constant US dollar at market exchange rates as of
2014.
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(January 1998 to December 2015), and South Korea (January 2001 to December
2015).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the interest rates of selective
maturities and the empirical level, slope, and curvature of the yield curves for
the four countries, across the whole and reduced periods. Over the crisis periods,
rates for all maturities have fallen to unusually low levels by any historical
reference. Since the onset of the financial crisis the slope of the yield curve in
all countries decreased steepening the curve, as the sharp fall of the short rates
was not followed by corresponding proportional falls of the long rates.
In the light of such important differences of the behaviour of interest rates, we
undertake the study of the impact of oil shocks on the yield over two periods for
the US and Canada. The whole sample period covering all the available data for
both countries and the shorter pre-crisis period when short-term interest rates
were ‘historically normal’, up to December 2008. This distinction will allow for
the study of the impact of oil shocks during ‘normal periods’, a situation more
likely to occur in the future as monetary policy reverts to its usual standard,
and compare them to a period characterised by both ‘normality’ and rates at the
zero-bounds accompanied by the exercise of unconventional monetary policy.13
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Term Structure Factors
We first present the estimation results for yield curve latent factors for the
four countries with their empirical counterparts defined earlier. Figure 4 shows
the estimated factors using maximum-likelihood estimation with Kalman filter.
13Bodenstein et al. (2013) demonstrate that the propagation of oil price shocks are different
when policy rates are at the zero lower bound. Specifically, when policy rates are at the zero
lower bound, inflation caused by oil price shocks can lower real rates, stimulating economic
activities and offsetting the usual contractionary effects.
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The estimated value for λ is different amongst the four countries (US 0.0393,
Canada 0.0672, Norway 0.0695, and South Korea 0.0522 with standard errors
0.0001, 0.0003, 0.0003, and 0.0016, respectively). The higher the value of λ is
indicative that the curvature factor reaches its maximum value at the shorter
maturity, and that the loading on the slope factor decays relatively faster across
maturities.
The estimated factors move closely together with their empirical proxies as in
related literature (for example, Diebold et al. 2006). The level moves most per-
sistently with least variation, whereas the curvature exhibits the higher volatil-
ity. Our estimate of the level of the US yield curve is high during prominent
inflation episodes in 1979 and 1982; subsequently the level has shown decreas-
ing trend. For all the countries in the sample, the same pattern is apparent
regarding the evolution of the level. In fact, the correlation between the level
factor and actual monthly CPI inflation is quite high (US 0.53, Canada 0.52,
Norway 0.20, and South Korea 0.49), confirming the close relationship between
level and inflation. Recent macro-finance literature interprets the level factor
as representing the medium-term inflation expectations (Ang and Piazzesi 2003
among many others)14 or market participants’ view of the underlying medium-
term inflation target of the central bank (Rudebusch and Wu 2008). The slope
for each country is negative in most periods implying that on average yields
increase along maturities. For any given estimated loadings, higher values of
the slope factor (i.e. less steep or sometimes inverted yield curve) are associ-
ated with high values of the curvature factor a finding also reported by Afonso
and Martins (2012). The estimated curvature moves closely with its empiri-
14The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
provide measures of inflation expectation in the US. The correlations between the estimated
level factors based on the model and the ten-year expected inflation estimates by the banks
are 0.93 (FRB Cleveland, between 1982:01 and 2015:12) and 0.33 (FRB Philadelphia, between
1998:01 and 2015:12).
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cal proxy (mid-term rate minus the average of short-term and long-term rate),
with high correlation ranging from 0.68 (US) to 0.96 (Norway). The spread
of the yield curve (gap between long-term and short-term rates) has long been
demonstrated to have some predictive power for economic growth and reces-
sions (Harvey 1988; Stock and Watson 1989; Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991;
Ioannidis and Peel 2003), which establishes the factor’s close relationship to
real economic activity. The patterns of association between slope and curva-
ture, discussed above, provide support for the argument of Mo¨nch (2012) that
increases of the curvature precede a flattening of the yield curve, which is fol-
lowed by a significant decline of output.
5.2. VAR Analysis - Impulse Responses (Full Sample)
In this section, we report the responses of the latent factors characterising
the yield curve to three different oil price shocks, using the whole sample period
ending at December 2015, which includes the epoch of the financial crisis re-
sulting in the exceptional behaviour of the short rate of interest since late 2008.
Unlike the majority of studies evaluating the impact of oil market shocks on
economic indices in terms of real shocks, the results presented here in terms of
nominal values. The shocks are normalised to represent one-standard deviation
of the innovation and are designed to represent an initial increase in the real
price of oil imitating either a negative supply or a positive demand shock.
5.2.1. Oil Supply Disruption
The first column of Figure 5 shows impulse response of three latent yield
curve factors of the four countries to sudden oil supply disruption. Solid lines
represent impulse response functions to the oil price shocks, and dashed lines
are one standard error bands computed using recursive-design wild bootstrap
proposed Gonc¸alves and Kilian (2004) with 2,000 replications. Shocks due an
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unexpected oil supply disruption cause an instantaneous increase of the level
factor in Canada, Norway and South Korea. Although these effects do not
persist long for Canada and Norway, they do persist in the case of South Korea.
In the US there is no response of the level factor to the shocks. This finding
regarding the US level is consistent with Kilian (2009)’s as he also found that
the impact of oil supply shocks on the overall price and subsequently to inflation
is limited.
The temporary increase of term structure levels in oil exporting countries
(Canada and Norway) is in line with the results of Charnavoki and Dolado (2014)
and Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010), where shocks which increase commodity
prices can have a favourable effect on the economy. The increase of interest
rates level is prominent in South Korea, peaking around 12 months following
a negative oil supply shock. This pronounced and persisting response in South
Korea may be related to its high dependency on crude oil, leading to greater
concerns about future inflation compared to other countries. This result is in
line with Baumeister et al. (2010) who found that countries with higher oil
dependency suffer more from consumer prices increases following an oil shock,
whereas inflationary pressures in net energy-exporting counties are negligible.
Slopes initially decrease after oil supply shocks in both the US and Canada.
This response is consistent with the central bank’s reaction, lowering the policy
rate, to offset possible negative effects on economic activity from oil supply
disruption. On the contrary, the decreases in slope factors of Norway and South
Korea are negligible and even begin increasing after a year. We interpret this
result in the case of Norway as follows: the oil price increase following an oil
supply shock acts as stimulating effect when crude oil constitutes large share
of exports. The response of slope factor to the same shock in South Korea
can be explained by the policy reaction, increasing the short rate, to reduce
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the inflationary pressure possibly associated with its high energy intensity and
dependency.15
Curvatures of Norway and South Korea increase after oil supply shocks and
persist longer in South Korea. This result may be understood by construing
oil supply shocks leading to short-lived inflation uncertainty in these countries,
affecting the risk premium of medium-term bonds delivering higher yield.16
5.2.2. Aggregate Demand Shocks
The responses of estimated yield factors to aggregate demand shocks are
shown in the middle column of Figure 5. The level factor in all countries in-
crease, with the response of the level being faster and stronger in Norway and
South Korea whilst for the US and Canada such responses were not statistically
significant.
The slope factor in oil importing countries (the US and South Korea) in-
creased after aggregate demand shocks, which is consistent with the central
bank’s policy reaction using conventional Taylor rules, as shocks to aggregate
demand move output and price in the same direction requiring tightening mon-
etary policy. The increases in slope is more prominent in South Korea, which
may be related to its higher dependency on oil (and its products) in its role
as input to production and as a consumption good. The impact of the shocks
on the slope on the Canadian yield curve is negligible, indicating a very mild
15The response of central banks to the variety of shocks can only be inferred by subsequent
policy reactions rather by explicit announcements by policy makers. Work by Krichene (2006)
concludes that, for the US, the relationship between oil prices and interest rates is a two-way
interconnection that depends on the type of oil shocks. During a supply shock, rising oil
prices caused interest rates to increase; whereas during a demand shock, falling interest rates
caused oil prices to rise. In the case of South Korea, Lee and Song (2009), in the context of
a simulated DSGE model found that an accommodative policy yields more stable outcomes.
16The macroeconomic content of term structure curvature is under-explored. Diebold et al.
(2006) report the effect of curvature surprises on macroeconomic variables is negligible. Em-
pirical evidence by Evans and Marshall (2007) shows that the curvature is not largely affected
by various macroeconomic shocks. However, Mo¨nch (2012) argues that surprises in curvature
are followed by slope increases, announcing a deterioration of output growth more than a year
ahead.
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response of the central bank to the shock. A more surprising result is the re-
sponse of the same factor in Norway, where the yield curve steepens, contrary to
conventional expectations regarding the reaction of monetary policy, suggesting
that the shocks have resulted in increases in the long-rate as investors assess the
reaction of the short rate was not sufficient to control future expected inflation.
5.2.3. Oil Market-Specific Shock
The last column of Figure 5 shows the responses of the yield curve factors to
oil market-specific demand shocks. The levels in the US, Canada, and South Ko-
rea increase for around six months; this response can be understood as the effect
of the high real price of oil and related products on inflation. It is interesting to
see that level decreases significantly in Norway. This negative responses of the
yield curve level in Norway might be due to the expected currency appreciation.
In the investigation to provide some potential explanations for a decline of
the inflationary pressure from oil price rises in the 2000s, Chen (2009) argues
that the appreciation of the domestic currency has been one of the major causes.
Basher et al. (2016) study the responses of exchange rates to the different sources
of oil shocks and show that currencies of oil-exporting countries appreciate after
oil market-specific demand shocks, but find no significant patterns in the adjust-
ment of exchange rates after oil supply and aggregate demand shocks in both
oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Buetzer et al. (2012) and Buetzer
et al. (2015) find that oil exporters tend to counter appreciation pressures after
an oil demand shocks by accumulating foreign exchange reserves and sovereign
wealth funds. The authors argue that these counter-balancing forces, preventing
large fluctuations in the nominal exchange rates, are the main reason for finding
no clear relationship between oil prices and exchange rate movements as theories
imply. However, the countries, especially with floating currencies, still experi-
ence a nominal appreciation following oil demand shocks. Bergholt et al. (2017)
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build two-country New Keynesian model to test the role of oil price shocks for
Norway and show that fiscal regime including a sovereign wealth fund and a
fiscal rule spending oil wealth plays an important role stabilizing its economy
against oil price shocks.
The significant increases of slopes in all countries are consistent with Kilian
(2009)’s argument that oil market-specific shocks, associated with precautionary
demand for oil, have been the main driver of real oil price fluctuations and act
as the largest inflation pressure.
Term structure curvature responses vary across countries. In the US, the
initial response is decreased curvature indicating a relative fall in mid-maturity
rates, stemming, in all probability from the response of the level, and the tem-
poral marked rise in the short rate; subsequently these pressures on the short
rate abate and the curvature returns to its previous value. The responses are
possibly related with the expectations over output deterioration due to the neg-
ative impact of the oil price hike. It can also be understood as a result of the
systematic policy response offsetting the anticipated inflationary effect (see, for
example, Bernanke et al. 1997) in the medium term. There is no immediate
reaction in Canada, after a period of two-three months the curvature increases,
indicating a possible over-reaction of the the mid-maturity rates to the tighten-
ing of monetary policy and steady level factor. Eventually as short rates return
to their pre-shock level the curvature returns to its equilibrium value. In Norway
the small decrease in the level factor associated with an increase in the short
rate puts upwards pressure on the mid-maturity rates, increasing temporarily
the curvature of the yield curve. As the short rate begins to fall and the long
rate returns to its previous value, this pressure subsides and the yield loses con-
cavity. Finally in the case of South Korea, initially all neighbouring rates (to
the short rate) move together leaving the curvature unchanged for up to a year
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after the shocks. Subsequently as short rate falls, is followed by an accelerated
decrease in the mid-maturity rates, manifesting as a falling curvature of the
South Korean yield curve.
The results reveal considerable variation of the responses of the curvature
factor across countries. Mo¨nch (2012) and Argyropoulos and Tzavalis (2016)
suggest that the curvature factor, entering with the opposite sign of the slope
factor, has predictive power for short run movements of economic activity due
to the monetary policy stance. The results obtained here can be considered the
consequences of such predictions conditional on the monetary policies across the
four counties in the study.
5.2.4. Yield Curves after the Shocks
To describe the entire term structure dynamics after each oil price shock, in
Figure 7, we provide the changing shape of yield curve after selective months
from the shocks. Each row represents the country-specific yield curve and each
column shows the shocks to oil supply, aggregate demand, and oil market-
specific demand. The curves with a solid line are average yield curve for es-
timation periods. The dotted and dash-dot line are for the yield curve after 3
and 12 months, respectively. The dashed line represents the yield curve after
24 months.
To the shocks in oil supply disruption, the US yield curve becomes steeper
during the first six months which is related to monetary policy response. How-
ever, as expectations over the future negative impact on growth dominate, the
yield curve begins to shift downwards after 12 months. In Canada, the dynamics
of yield curve show a similar pattern to the US, but the magnitude is slightly
larger than that of the US. The yield curves for Norway and South Korea react
more to oil price shocks, both in terms of position and shape, which is reason-
able as these two countries are more exposed to oil shocks. The yield curve for
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Norway shifts upwards after on oil supply shock and returns below its initial
level after 24 months, whilst in South Korea following the initial shift upwards
the yield curve is set at a lower level but above its original position.
Aggregate demand shocks have smaller impact on the dynamics of the term
structure of interest rates in all four countries. For oil exporting countries such
as Canada and Norway the yield curve settles eventually at below its pre-shock
level, the difference is more pronounced in the case of Norway. For both the US
and South Korea the total effect after 24 months is almost negligible.
In most cases, following an oil market-specific demand shock the yield curves
shift upwards in the immediate aftermath, in line with Kilian (2009)’s finding
that oil market-specific shocks have the largest impact on the real price of oil
which imply its highest influence on inflation expectation despite the policy rate
response to moderate its impact on overall price. Regarding real oil price shocks,
similar results are also reported by Kapetanios and Tzavalis (2010) showing
that such shocks lead to predictions of higher expected inflation and subsequent
increases in the short rates, worsening the economic outlook. Generally speaking
the yield curves after 24 months have become steeper, lying below their original
levels, with the short rate remaining at the same level in the US and Canada
and falling in Norway and South Korea. This is due to the dominant negative
effect on output following such shocks. In this case, central banks eventually
reduce short rates pushing downwards all the near-by maturities.
5.3. Variance Decompositions
To quantify the importance of the structural shocks in global oil market
on the dynamics of the yield curve, Table 2 reports the forecast error variance
decompositions of the three yield factors to oil supply, global aggregate demand,
and oil market-specific demand shocks.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the results for the US. On impact, the effect of
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three identified global oil market shocks on the level, slope, and curvature are
negligible, with 1.0%, 1.2%, and 0.5% of total variability in the respective factors
associated with all the shocks from the global oil market. The variability of level
accounted by oil market shocks increases to 4.0% after 12 months with most of
the effect coming from oil market-specific demand shock. Global oil market
shocks do not explain much for the US slope factor, only 4.6% is explained by
them after 60 months. Aggregate demand and oil market-specific demand shocks
have non-negligible explanatory power on the yield curve curvature, accounting
for more than 10% after 24 months.
The results of the decomposition of the forecast errors variance for the Cana-
dian yield factors are summarised in Panel B of Table 2. After 12 months, shocks
in global oil market shocks account for around 5% of the forecast error variance,
of the level factor, similar share for the slope and up to 9.5% for the curva-
ture. However, over time, and after 48 months these proportions rise to 9.3%,
6.3% and 19.9% respectively, evidence that impact of oil shocks, from different
sources, have a pronounced medium term effect on both the slope, level and
curvature of the yield curve.
Panels C and D of Table 2 show that innovations from global oil market
explain a large part of the forecast error variance of the yield factors in Norway
and South Korea. Initially, the variances of the level factors are mainly ex-
plained by their own innovations. However, along longer forecast horizons, say
12 months or more, at least 20% of the forecast error variances of these factors
are explained by the oil market shocks, and these proportions increases signifi-
cantly after 48 months. The same pattern emerges in the case of the variance
decomposition of the slope and curvature factors for both countries.
More specifically oil market-specific demand shocks explain a considerable
proportion of the forecast error variable of the interest rates level in Norway.
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They account for around a third of the level variance among the overall variances
due to oil price shocks after 12 months and the proportion rising to 61.9% after
48 months, whilst for the slope, the shocks account on the average for 80% of
the slope variance over the same time span. Regarding the shocks impact on the
decomposition of the variability of the curvature forecast error the share rises
from 46.9% to 63.0%, indicating the increasing importance of this type shock
on Norway’s yield curve.
In the case of South Korea, more than 36% of the variability of each yield
factor can be attributed to the presence of the shocks within the first 24 months
and the share remains stable, albeit with different decomposition, over the 60
month period. Interestingly, oil supply shocks have large explanatory power for
the variance of the forecast errors of level factor in South Korea after the first
12 months, thereafter its importance decreases somewhat after 36 months. The
shocks’ impact on the variance of the slope and curvature rises fast reaching
almost 20% within the same period.
It is of interest that aggregate demand shocks have a modest but very steady
impact on all the factors of the yield curve, indicating a very modest movement
of the yield curve. Oil market-specific demand shocks explain a substantial
proportion of the variance of South Korean yield slope. It is remarkable that
whilst within 12 months in contribution is only 2.8%, by the end of month 48
this has risen to 15.7%, whilst for slope and curvature this shock accounts for
17.8% and 15.7% respectively.
Although since late 2008 nominal short-term interest rates have assumed
almost zero values and the long-term rates have been below 4% and interest
rates in other economies have also recorded on unprecedented low level, this
analysis has established the importance of the impact of shocks from the global
oil markets on the shape and positions of the yield curves for four countries.
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Our result suggests that there is no universal outcome from such shocks and
that their impact has to be calculated on a country basis taking into account its
position as an oil exporter or importer. Whilst the yield curve of large economies
as the US do not exhibit substantial changes after such innovations, for small
open oil importing economies like Norway and South Korea, such incidents have
pronounced and persistent impact on their financial markets as bond yields are
affected by oil shocks.
5.4. Robustness Check
We next consider the impact of oil market shocks on the yield curve by
considering the period from the beginning of the available sample to the end of
2008, where interest rates were fluctuating near their historical levels. From the
onset of the financial crisis, financial and commodity markets witnessed a truly
unusual conduct of monetary policy in almost all Western economies. Policy
rates in the US have reached to all intents and purposes the zero lower bound
and have been kept at this rates for almost 9 consecutive years. For example
during the first period the average three-month rate is 6.2% and the ten year
rate 7.5%. From January 2009 the same maturity rates averaged 0.2% and 2.7%
respectively. Over the same period in Canada, the impact of the financial crisis
was less pronounced. Although the yield curve shifted downwards, the average
of the the three month rate was around 1% compared to its before crisis mean
of 5.7% and the long-term rates have also declined from 6.8% to 2.5%.
The previous analysis is based on the whole data sample that is constituted
by these very distinct periods regarding the statistical behaviour of the yield
curve, both in terms of position and shape. The limited number of data points
available in the aftermath of the financial crisis does not allow for the separate
econometric analysis from January 2009. To examine the possible future impact
of the oil shocks in a period where interest rates are set without reference to the
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immediacy dictated by the financial crisis, we conduct the same econometric
analysis over the pre-crisis period only. This exercise will allow to test whether
the current unusual conduct of monetary policy has cushioned the impact of oil
market shocks on the yield curves of the US and Canada.
Figure 6 reports impulse response of three yield factors to oil price inno-
vations. The effect of an oil supply shock has no initial discernible effect on
the level, slope and curvature factors. Over the subsequent periods there is a
predicted decrease in the slope and a corresponding increase in curvature im-
plying a fall in the short rate to ameliorate the predicted impact of the shock on
output. The major impact on the US yield curve is due to oil market-specific
demand shocks. In this case there is a strong and persistent increase of the
level factor, followed by a corresponding increase in the slope and decrease in
curvature. The response is qualitatively similar to the one calculated using the
whole sample period, however in this case unlike the previous, the impact of the
shock on the level is significant and very persistent. This may signify that once
interest rates return to their previous levels the sensitivity of the yield curve to
oil market shocks will far more noticeable.
There is also a remarkable increase of the contribution of the same shocks on
the variance decomposition of the level, slope and curvature factors as reported
in Table 3. These now stand at 7.1%, 5.2% and 10.0% after 12 months, compared
to 4.0%, 2.9%, and 9.2% when the whole sample was used, and the equivalent
contributions after 48 months now stand at 17.2%, 5.2% and 11.3% rather than
2.6%, 3.7% and 10.9%. The main conclusion from this analysis is that this type
of oil market disturbances cause substantial increases of the ‘equilibrium’ rate of
interest during ‘normal’ periods. Currently the extremely low rates of interest
provide for a protective cushion, keeping such rate unaffected.
In Canada, similarly to the US an oil supply shock does affect the level and
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has a strong and persistent affect on the slope. The slope declines, implying a
fall of the short-term rate. This finding is consistent with the expected response
of any central bank to the expected fall in activity, following such an oil marker
disturbance. Unlike the case of the US, oil market-specific demand shocks ex-
ercise downward pressure on the level factor and tend to flatten the yield curve
as short rates are rising whilst the long rate tends to fall, as the slope rises.
It seems that the reaction of the Canadian central bank to this shock, by rais-
ing the short rate, is sufficient signal to indicate lower future inflation, pushing
downwards the long rate. Aggregate demand shocks lead again the short-term
rate rises, flattening the yield curve and this impact is more pronounced during
the pre-crisis period. These findings point towards the existence of a ‘recent
reluctance’ by the Central Banks to raise the short rate in the presence of oil
market shocks. The contributions of these shocks to the variance decomposition
of the three factors is higher overall in both 12 month and 48 month horizons,
with marked increased contributions in the level and curvature factors. The
more striking point from this analysis is that in both countries we found that
the level factor was far more sensitive to oil market shocks in the pre-crisis
period.
6. Conclusion
We study the impact of the oil price shocks on the term structure of inter-
est rates across four industrial countries; the US, Canada, Norway, and South
Korea. Our results indicate that the yield curve factors (level, slope, and curva-
ture) react differently to oil market shocks contingent on the underlying sources
that drive them, the country’s dependence on oil, and the manner of conduct
of monetary policy.
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Undertaking the analysis over the whole sample, we find that oil market-
specific demand shocks result in increases of level factor in oil-importing coun-
tries, whilst have no such effect in oil-exporting countries. Oil supply disruptions
have short-lived negative responses of the slope factors in the US and Canada,
associated with the loosening of monetary policy, whilst demand side shocks
lead to slope increases in all countries, resulting from short-term rate rises. The
supply and demand shocks jointly account for a considerable amount of the ob-
served variation in the term structure of interest rates, explaining up to almost
half of the changes of the South Korea, 20% in Canada and Norway, whilst have
limited impact on the US. It is evident that South Korea as net oil importer
is relatively very sensitive to oil market fluctuations, compared to oil exporting
countries like Canada and Norway. The combined contribution of these shocks
to the variance decomposition of the US yield curve is limited to approximately
10%.
Despite the significant variations between the four countries, found on the
impact of oil market shocks, we established that all yield curves respond via
some factor. This effect has been neglected in the literature as it has focused
almost exclusively on macroeconomic aggregates and their relationship with
financial variables has been limited in stock market. Our results suggest that
oil shocks independently of their sources will affect the discount factors as they
alter the position and shape of the yield curves.
Sub-sample estimation exercise reveals that the unusual monetary policy
condition during the crisis time had altered the relationship between oil price
and the term structure of sovereign yields. For both the US and Canada we find
that the impact of these shocks on yield curve is more noticeable and persistent.
The current monetary policy, keeping extremely low policy rates, has limited the
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impact of oil markets developments on the factors of the yield curve, providing
additional stability in these rather uncertain times.
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IPTTable 1: Summary Statistics for the Full and Sub-Sample Periods
3M 2Y 5Y Level Slope Curvature
1973M1 - 2015M12 5.20 5.67 6.19 6.72 -1.52 -0.59
United States 1973M1 - 2008M12 6.17 6.66 7.09 7.50 -1.33 -0.34
2009M1 - 2015M12 0.24 0.54 1.55 2.74 -2.51 -1.90
1986M1 - 2015M12 4.56 4.89 5.35 5.81 -1.25 -0.60
Canada 1986M1 - 2008M12 5.72 6.03 6.44 6.81 -1.09 -0.47
2009M1 - 2015M12 0.77 1.14 1.77 2.53 -1.76 -1.02
1998M1 - 2015M12 3.56 3.56 3.78 4.15 -0.58 -0.59
Norway 1998M1 - 2008M12 4.81 4.75 4.85 5.03 -0.23 -0.33
2009M1 - 2015M12 1.61 1.69 2.11 2.75 -1.14 -0.98
2001M1 - 2015M12 3.51 4.02 4.34 4.67 -1.16 -0.14
South Korea 2001M1 - 2008M12 4.42 4.94 5.18 5.49 -1.07 -0.03
2009M1 - 2015M12 2.47 2.97 3.39 3.74 -1.27 -0.27
Notes: This table reports the average values of the yields with selective maturities and three
factors of yield curves. The level, slope, and curvature in this table represent the average
values of the empirical counterparts for the yield factor estimates, and are calculated as
yt(120), yt(3) − yt(120), and 2 × yt(24)− (yt(3) + yt(120)), respectively.
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Table 2: Yield Curve Factor Variance Decomposition
Oil Aggregate Oil Oil market
Periods supply demand demand Level Slope Curvature shocks
shocks shocks shocks aggregated
Panel A. Yield Factors Variance Decomposition for the US (Jan 1973 - Dec 2015)
(Level)
1 0.000 0.005 1.043 98.951 0.000 0.000 1.049
12 0.157 1.318 2.478 89.342 2.144 4.561 3.952
24 0.108 0.759 1.623 78.012 14.326 5.173 2.489
36 0.102 0.875 1.417 59.435 30.401 7.769 2.394
48 0.115 1.200 1.330 46.822 40.700 9.833 2.645
60 0.126 1.407 1.243 40.235 46.072 10.917 2.777
(Slope)
1 0.727 0.133 0.364 14.250 84.527 0.000 1.223
12 1.164 0.724 1.043 7.537 82.065 7.467 2.931
24 1.088 0.570 0.792 5.542 79.639 12.369 2.450
36 1.074 0.555 1.172 5.204 79.068 12.926 2.802
48 1.077 0.717 1.952 5.189 78.212 12.853 3.746
60 1.073 0.966 2.557 5.167 77.475 12.762 4.596
(Curvature)
1 0.074 0.010 0.420 16.098 0.034 83.364 0.504
12 0.716 6.698 1.756 8.299 3.170 79.360 9.170
24 0.804 6.527 3.270 7.326 4.511 77.564 10.600
36 0.745 5.868 4.068 7.778 7.953 73.588 10.681
48 0.714 5.370 4.808 8.613 11.380 69.115 10.892
60 0.694 5.246 5.436 9.008 14.050 65.566 11.376
Panel B. Yield Factors Variance Decomposition for Canada (Jan 1986 - Dec 2015)
(Level)
1 0.000 0.217 0.928 98.855 0.000 0.000 1.145
12 0.809 1.989 1.646 86.416 1.127 8.013 4.444
24 0.744 1.474 1.910 77.552 5.790 12.530 4.129
36 1.157 2.536 2.241 59.500 17.834 16.732 5.934
48 1.468 5.251 2.541 48.024 24.494 18.222 9.260
60 1.682 9.270 2.917 41.938 25.948 18.245 13.869
(Slope)
1 1.233 0.008 0.087 6.166 92.505 0.000 1.329
12 2.093 0.265 2.345 4.094 83.586 7.617 4.703
24 1.724 0.223 3.888 2.764 80.605 10.796 5.835
36 1.680 0.245 4.321 2.808 79.865 11.081 6.247
48 1.683 0.251 4.339 2.811 79.836 11.081 6.272
60 1.689 0.253 4.340 2.810 79.817 11.091 6.282
(Curvature)
1 0.458 0.084 0.327 12.952 1.045 85.134 0.869
12 3.574 3.297 2.585 6.544 4.641 79.360 9.455
24 6.755 4.577 8.004 9.601 8.330 62.732 19.336
36 7.026 4.642 8.089 11.543 7.995 60.706 19.756
48 7.140 4.612 8.101 11.718 8.355 60.075 19.852
60 7.202 4.625 8.087 11.813 8.508 59.765 19.914
Notes: This table reports percent contributions of oil price shocks to each term structure
factor. The forecast error variance decomposition is obtained using the structural VAR model
described in the text. The last column is the sum of the contributions of the three oil price
shocks in explaining the factor variances.
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Table 2: Yield Curve Factor Variance Decomposition (continued)
Oil Aggregate Oil Oil market
Periods supply demand demand Level Slope Curvature shocks
shocks shocks shocks aggregated
Panel C. Yield Factors Variance Decomposition for Norway (Jan 1998 - Dec 2015)
(Level)
1 0.032 1.953 0.072 97.944 0.000 0.000 2.056
12 7.376 11.505 8.520 67.873 3.240 1.486 27.401
24 5.267 8.434 7.711 54.050 4.602 19.936 21.412
36 3.526 5.873 11.243 46.033 2.993 30.333 20.641
48 4.313 5.983 16.746 43.162 2.464 27.332 27.043
60 5.260 6.895 19.251 40.898 2.452 25.244 31.407
(Slope)
1 0.322 4.339 2.404 52.192 40.742 0.000 7.065
12 0.772 1.925 21.895 17.894 28.645 28.868 24.593
24 1.974 2.680 19.356 19.080 24.009 32.902 24.009
36 2.696 3.389 18.959 21.502 22.649 30.806 25.043
48 2.985 3.706 19.334 21.458 22.196 30.321 26.025
60 3.070 3.811 19.264 21.345 22.035 30.475 26.145
(Curvature)
1 0.190 0.002 0.862 36.991 0.637 61.317 1.054
12 3.278 0.749 3.562 26.416 5.745 60.250 7.589
24 4.930 0.811 9.490 26.267 6.781 51.720 15.232
36 6.124 0.910 11.285 26.699 6.570 48.412 18.319
48 6.338 1.077 12.648 25.945 6.690 47.302 20.063
60 6.400 1.173 12.629 25.848 6.870 47.080 20.203
Panel D. Yield Factors Variance Decomposition for South Korea (Jan 2001 - Dec 2015)
(Level)
1 0.573 0.001 3.169 96.257 0.000 0.000 3.743
12 27.119 8.098 2.815 58.503 2.558 0.907 38.032
24 34.116 7.941 4.857 45.002 3.846 4.238 46.914
36 32.231 6.183 8.453 32.285 10.759 10.090 46.866
48 24.850 4.681 15.729 24.222 19.519 10.999 45.260
60 20.943 4.455 22.597 19.918 22.270 9.818 47.995
(Slope)
1 0.146 0.782 0.070 68.495 30.507 0.000 0.997
12 0.668 7.927 23.286 25.958 40.153 2.009 31.881
24 7.466 9.343 19.627 20.559 40.526 2.479 36.436
36 13.605 9.806 20.555 17.366 35.481 3.187 43.966
48 19.256 9.141 17.824 14.988 34.785 4.006 46.220
60 18.723 8.522 19.544 13.952 34.722 4.537 46.789
(Curvature)
1 1.574 0.520 0.001 0.158 0.224 97.523 2.095
12 15.572 8.233 10.897 4.352 4.671 56.275 34.702
24 15.130 9.611 14.291 6.418 4.825 49.726 39.032
36 19.884 9.269 13.587 6.065 7.148 44.047 42.740
48 18.784 8.391 15.722 5.916 10.684 40.504 42.896
60 17.908 8.134 18.789 5.571 11.995 37.603 44.831
Notes: This table reports percent contributions of oil price shocks to each term structure
factor. The forecast error variance decomposition is obtained using the structural VAR model
described in the text. The last column is the sum of the contributions of the three oil price
shocks in explaining the factor variances.
45
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Table 3: Yield Curve Factor Variance Decomposition (Sub-Sample)
Oil Aggregate Oil Oil market
Periods supply demand demand Level Slope Curvature shocks
shocks shocks shocks aggregated
Panel A. Yield Factors Variance Decomposition for the US (Jan 1973 - Dec 2008)
(Level)
1 0.006 0.859 0.945 98.190 0.000 0.000 1.810
12 0.118 0.562 6.404 80.891 3.430 8.594 7.084
24 0.172 1.267 9.476 66.378 17.743 4.965 10.915
36 0.224 2.437 12.792 48.472 31.921 4.154 15.453
48 0.200 2.604 14.413 36.904 40.371 5.508 17.218
60 0.172 2.315 14.734 30.468 44.799 7.513 17.220
(Slope)
1 0.890 0.147 0.130 9.543 89.290 0.000 1.167
12 0.864 2.731 1.620 4.154 80.900 9.730 5.216
24 0.600 1.918 1.388 2.878 78.210 15.005 3.906
36 0.578 2.229 1.495 2.671 77.878 15.148 4.302
48 0.593 2.665 1.932 2.643 77.178 14.989 5.190
60 0.600 2.793 2.186 2.658 76.780 14.983 5.579
(Curvature)
1 0.085 0.703 0.484 14.162 0.008 84.558 1.271
12 1.024 6.453 2.535 6.828 2.876 80.284 10.012
24 1.024 5.649 5.302 7.508 3.736 76.780 11.975
36 0.988 5.520 5.174 9.916 7.824 70.577 11.682
48 1.003 5.492 4.802 11.217 12.044 65.443 11.296
60 1.021 6.400 4.650 11.314 14.066 62.549 12.071
Panel B. Yield Factors Variance Decomposition for Canada (Jan 1986 - Dec 2008)
(Level)
1 0.050 1.932 0.096 97.922 0.000 0.000 2.078
12 1.424 3.135 0.680 84.000 2.761 7.999 5.240
24 0.998 2.889 1.597 73.000 13.724 7.792 5.484
36 0.852 9.467 1.712 53.370 23.395 11.204 12.032
48 0.798 12.202 1.681 43.089 24.341 17.889 14.681
60 0.769 12.554 2.375 37.250 24.336 22.716 15.697
(Slope)
1 0.867 0.264 0.071 7.365 91.434 0.000 1.201
12 2.094 0.484 2.048 5.117 83.632 6.625 4.626
24 1.719 0.535 3.102 3.576 81.521 9.546 5.356
36 1.687 0.833 3.371 3.645 80.540 9.924 5.891
48 1.687 0.937 3.390 3.649 80.377 9.960 6.014
60 1.693 0.958 3.458 3.640 80.190 10.060 6.110
(Curvature)
1 0.201 1.152 0.126 13.122 0.815 84.583 1.480
12 3.271 9.700 4.148 6.723 4.095 72.063 17.119
24 5.716 17.691 9.479 7.078 6.641 53.396 32.886
36 6.086 17.171 9.089 8.951 6.796 51.907 32.347
48 6.195 18.090 8.923 9.118 6.794 50.880 33.208
60 6.260 18.051 8.984 9.167 6.868 50.669 33.295
Notes: This table reports percent contributions of oil price shocks to each term structure
factor. The forecast error variance decomposition is obtained using the structural VAR model
described in the text. The last column is the sum of the contributions of the three oil price
shocks in explaining the factor variances.
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Figure 1: Loadings for Three Yield Factors (λ = 0.0609)
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Notes: This figure shows the factor loadings as a function of maturities from 0 to 120 months,
for λ = 0.0609. Solid line, which is constant at 1, represents the loading for level. Decreasing
dashed line is the loading for slope and the dash-dot line is the loading for curvature. The
value for λ is from Diebold and Li (2006).
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Figure 2: Countries’ Characteristics in Oil Production and Consumption
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-600 -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200
NOR
CAN
KOR
US
GBR
DEU
JPN
ITAFRA
AUS
Energy Dependency (Net Energy Import/Energy Usage, 2013)
O
il In
ten
sity o
f G
D
P
 (M
to
e p
er trillio
n
 2
0
0
5
 U
S$
, 2
0
1
4
)
a. Energy Dependency and Oil Intensity of GDP
US Canada Norway South Korea
Th
ou
sa
nd
 B
ar
re
ls 
Pe
r D
ay
#104
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Production
Consumption
b. Crude Oil Production and Consumption
Notes: Energy dependency is net energy imports divided by the total energy usage as of 2013.
Net energy imports are estimated by IEA (International Energy Agency) as energy usage less
production, both measured in oil equivalents. The oil intensity is the ratio of oil consumption
(Mtoes) over gross domestic product measured in constant US dollar at market exchange
rates as of 2014. Crude oil production and consumption are from IEA as of 2014. Crude oil
production includes lease condensate.
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Figure 3: Monthly Bond Yields
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Notes: This figure shows end-of-month bond yields for the US, Canada, Norway, and South
Korea. Each yield curve has 17 maturities (3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 30, 35, 48, 60, 72, 84, 96,
108, and 120 months). The sample periods are different among countries due to availability.
49
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Figure 4: Estimates of Level, Slope, and Curvature
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Notes: Solid lines are estimated yield factors (level, slope, and curvature for each country)
using state-space model. We show empirical counterparts of the factors (yt(120), yt(3) −
yt(120), and 2 × yt(24)− (yt(3) + yt(120))) with dashed lines.
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Figure 4: Estimates of Level, Slope, and Curvature (continued)
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Notes: Solid lines are estimated yield factors (level, slope, and curvature for each country)
using state-space model. We show empirical counterparts of the factors (yt(120), yt(3) −
yt(120), and 2 × yt(24)− (yt(3) + yt(120))) with dashed lines.
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Figure 5: Responses of the Yield Curve Factors to Structural Oil Market Shocks
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b. Canada (Jan 1986 - Dec 2015)
Notes: Responses are to one-standard deviation structural shocks in oil market shocks based
on the SVAR model. Dotted lines represent one standard error bands constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap proposed by Gonc¸alves and Kilian (2004).
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Figure 5: Responses of the Yield Curve Factors to Structural Oil Market Shocks (continued)
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d. South Korea (Jan 2001 - Dec 2015)
Notes: Responses are to one-standard deviation structural shocks in oil market shocks based
on the SVAR model. Dotted lines represent one standard error bands constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap proposed by Gonc¸alves and Kilian (2004).
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Figure 6: Responses of the Yield Curve Factors to Structural Oil Market Shocks (Sub-Sample)
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Notes: Responses are to one-standard deviation structural shocks in oil market shocks based
on the SVAR model. Dotted lines represent one standard error bands constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap proposed by Gonc¸alves and Kilian (2004).
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Figure 7: Yield Curve Dynamics after Oil Market Shocks (Full Sample)
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Notes: Figures show the changing shapes of yield curves in 3, 12, and 24 months to three oil
market shocks. Initial curves with solid line have the average shapes of the yield curves for the
corresponding estimation periods. The dotted and dash-dot line are for the yield curve after
3 and 12 months, respectively. The dashed line represents the yield curve after 24 months.
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Notes: Figures show the changing shapes of yield curves in 3, 12, and 24 months to three oil
market shocks. Initial curves with solid line have the average shapes of the yield curves for the
corresponding estimation periods. The dotted and dash-dot line are for the yield curve after
3 and 12 months, respectively. The dashed line represents the yield curve after 24 months.
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Highlights
• Term structures of interest rates react differently to different types of oil price shocks.
• Yield factors of the countries with high oil dependency fluctuate more to oil price
shocks.
• The impact of oil shocks on yield curve is more noticeable and persistent in normal
times.
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